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Mega-FTAs and the Trade-Security 
Nexus: The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP)
V I N O D  K .  A G G A R W A L 
S U M M A R Y   The rise of a multiplicity of diverse bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) has led countries to pursue mega-FTAs to manage the 
growing complexity of global trade arrangements. The US and China are 
promoting rival accords: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would 
encompass 800 million people and almost 40 percent of global GDP, is 
a centerpiece of the Obama Asia Pacific strategy. The Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) would account for 30 percent of 
global GDP, with a population of over three billion people, creating the 
largest FTA in the world. TPP advocates assert that it will strengthen the 
US’ strategic role in the region, in part by countering China’s membership 
in the RCEP. These claims, made in response to growing skepticism in the 
United States about the value of liberalized trade, overemphasize the TPP's 
strategic value. At the same time, projecting the economic impact of the TPP 
is thorny, given the deal’s scope and the diversity of countries involved. 
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RCEP advocates 
argue that it can 
be a stepping-stone 
to the broader and  
more liberal TPP, 
rather than a rival  
mega-FTA
Global trade has rapidly expanded since the end 
of World War II, leading to greater efficiency and 
growth in the global economy. For decades, first un-
der the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and then its successor organiza-
tion the World Trade Organization (WTO), coun-
tries successfully negotiated the reduction of both 
tariffs and nontariff barriers every few years, conven-
ing in “rounds” named by location. But in December 
2015, after 14 years of fruitless negotiations, WTO 
members terminated the Doha Round.
Even before the demise of the Doha Round, 
growing frustration with the slow pace of multilat-
eral negotiations led many countries to seek alterna-
tive ways to liberalize international trade, including 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), minilateral 
regional accords, sectoral accords, and more recently, 
so-called mega-FTAs that link countries across re-
gions.1 Two prominent mega-FTAs involve countries 
in the Asia Pacific—the recently concluded but yet-
to-be-ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—and 
the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). 
Proponents of each accord have high expectations 
and are making bold claims. Advocates of the TPP as-
sert that it will strengthen the US’ strategic role in the 
region, in part by countering China’s membership in 
the RCEP, claims made in response to growing skep-
ticism in the United States about the value of liberal-
ized trade. Advocates of the RCEP argue that it can 
be a stepping-stone to the broader and more liberal 
TPP, rather than rival mega-FTAs, with both even-
tually subsumed into a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP) under the auspices of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Before focusing on these claims, it is useful to 
examine the institutional context within which the 
agreements are being negotiated and the nature of 
both agreements.
Moving Away from Multilateralism 
The Doha Round negotiations began in 2001, with 
the goal of further broad-scale trade liberaliza-
tion. But as the Doha Round dragged on, countries 
continued to pursue alternative approaches to trade 
liberalization.
First, on a sectoral basis, countries negotiated 
specific multilateral liberalization including the In-
formation Technology Agreement in 1997, the Basic 
Telecom Agreement in 1998, and the Financial Ser-
vice Agreement in 1999.
Second, on a regional basis, countries have con-
tinued to pursue trade liberalization integration, in-
cluding the European Union (EU); the US-Canada 
FTA in 1989 that evolved into the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1995; the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free 
Trade Agreement in 1992, which evolved into the 
ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. 
Third, since the late 1990s, countries have negoti-
ated a flurry of bilateral FTAs. While there were only 
47 FTAs in 1994, the number had increased to 262 
by the end of 2015.2 Major economic powers such 
as the United States, the EU, China, and Japan and 
medium-sized economies such as South Korea, Chile, 
Mexico, and Singapore have all negotiated an array 
of bilateral FTAs—often with strategic and political 
objectives in mind. The result of this rapid expansion 
has been labeled “spaghetti” or a “noodle bowl.” 
All three approaches can be problematic. Sec-
toral agreements tend to undermine the coalition 
for free trade by focusing on “winners” from trade 
agreements.3 By simply liberalizing in one sector, ne-
gotiators cannot engage in cross-sectoral trade-offs. 
This makes it difficult to move forward on broad-
scale trade negotiations in forums such as the WTO 
because “losers” or uncompetitive industries block 
negotiations, while globally successful industries lose 
interest since sectoral arrangements meet their goals. 
Regional approaches create their own sets of 
rules and procedures, and often have regional con-
tent requirements that impede global sourcing ef-
forts. The recent conflicts between the United States 
and the EU over the latter’s regulation of Google and 
other American companies demonstrate the poten-
tial problems of creating differing regulatory regimes.
Bilateral FTAs, with their varying provisions, can 
also lead to significant discrimination and impede 
trade. Indeed, this growing complexity provided 
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one of the key motives for countries to turn to mega-
FTAs—multilateral FTAs that involve a large number 
of participants across vast distances. The goal of these 
agreements has been to rationalize the multiplicity of 
bilateral FTAs. Put differently, as some analysts have 
suggested, the spaghetti might be made into lasagna.4
With the proliferation of both bilateral and re-
gional accords in the Asia Pacific region, it is no sur-
prise that these countries have been among the first 
to embark on mega-FTA negotiations. The logic is 
that mega-FTAs with 12 to 16 members might be 
more tractable in terms of negotiations than the 
162-member WTO. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Twelve countries in Asia and the Americas negotiated 
the TPP trade deal, concluding in October 2015. 
Alongside the United States and Canada, the ac-
cord includes three Latin American countries (Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru), four Southeast Asian countries 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), and 
three traditional US partners in the region (Australia, 
Japan, and New Zealand). The TPP would create a 
free trade area encompassing 800 million people and 
almost 40 percent of global GDP.5
The idea of creating a pan–Asia Pacific trade 
agreement, began to move forward in 2006 with en-
thusiastic support from the APEC Business Advisory 
Council. The strategy was to turn APEC from a talk 
shop into the FTAAP.
Yet given APEC’s lack of an institutional mecha-
nism to negotiate trade agreements, as well as its large 
membership of 21 economies, efforts to promote the 
FTAAP faced strong headwinds.6 Meanwhile, the 
Trans‐Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agree-
ment, known as the P4, begun in 2002 by Chile, New 
Zealand, and Singapore, with Brunei joining the ne-
gotiations in 2005, began to move forward. This P4 
agreement called for trade liberalization that went 
beyond traditional border barriers to include such 
elements as the regulation of intellectual property, 
rules of origin, and government procurement—often 
referred to as “behind-the-border” measures. The P4 
FTA left the door open for other countries in the 
region to join. In September 2008, the Bush Admin-
istration signaled its intent to become part of the so-
called P4, which subsequently evolved into the TPP, 
as part of its own Asian engagement strategy. Soon 
thereafter, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam announced 
their intention to participate.
In November 2009, the Obama Administration 
affirmed that it intended to take part in TPP negotia-
tions. After several years of prolonged negotiations, 
agreement was finally reached in October 2015. Yet, 
TPP ratification is hardly a foregone conclusion, par-
ticularly in the United States. A number of specific 
areas of the agreement have proven contentious, and 
these disputes will continue to fester as the TPP 
moves toward ratification. 
First, with respect to intellectual property (IP) 
provisions, the TPP mimics current US law, foster-
ing complaints both in the United States and abroad. 
Foreign TPP partners are resistant to expanding their 
copyright protections to the American scope, argu-
ing that such regulations impede their sovereignty.7 
Some American interest groups are concerned that 
enacting an agreement that freezes IP laws as of the 
signing date will prevent US legislators from adapt-
ing laws in the future to meet the evolving needs of 
digital innovation and entrench controversial poli-
cies such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA). The DMCA, criticized for censoring on-
line content through spurious copyright claims, has 
fewer mechanisms for reviewing such content before 
removing it than copyright laws abroad.8
With respect to pharmaceuticals, members of 
Congress have expressed concern that increased IP 
regulation will restrict access to medicine in the devel-
oping world, weakening access to inexpensive generic 
drugs. Biologics, a class of drugs developed to treat 
rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, Crohn’s disease, and 
many others, have also been a source of much con-
troversy. The pharmaceutical industry lobbied for 
increased protections to prevent competitors from 
copying and selling biosimilars without expending 
the same resources on clinical trials. Current US law 
protects such drugs for 12 years, but under fire, the 
United States negotiated a two-track system that pro-
tects data for either 5 or 8 years.9 
Specific areas 
of the TPP are 
contentious, and 
these disputes will 
continue to fester 
as the TPP moves 
toward ratification
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Second, currency manipulation issues have cre-
ated controversy. While the TPP has no specific 
language around currency manipulation, there is a 
separate anti-manipulation declaration that lacks any 
specific enforcement mechanisms.10
Third, although the TPP states that state-owned 
enterprises cannot be favored over private entities, 
the complexity of ownership and structure of state-
owned enterprises in Southeast Asia leaves many un-
answered questions over how to enforce this clause.11 
For free-market proponents, the validation of foreign 
state-owned enterprises is against the principles the 
TPP supposedly espouses.12
Fourth, the TTP’s Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement (ISDS) clause enables foreign companies 
to sue national governments in binding arbitration 
for regulations that may diminish profitability.13 
This could lead to investors being compensated for 
governments implementing regulations designed 
to promote sustainability, human rights, and in-
tellectual property. The TPP contains a “tobacco 
carveout” from ISDS, which excludes anti-tobacco 
measures from investor-state disputes, but, with the 
sweeping powers given to foreign companies, coun-
tries’ power to create product safety or public health 
laws remains unclear.14
From an aggregate economic standpoint, pro-
jecting the impact of the TPP is particularly thorny 
given the deal’s scope and the diversity of countries 
involved. According to a widely cited 2012 study, up-
dated in 2016, swift TPP implementation will raise 
US real income by $131 billion by 2030, with similar 
large gains in Japan.15 Meanwhile, a 2016 World Bank 
Study using another CGE model found that the GDP 
impact on the United States and Australia will be 
negligible, with few losses for non-TPP members in 
the region.16 These widely diverging projections show 
the uncertainty of the TPP’s economic outcome.
With growing opposition to trade liberalization, 
and to globalization more generally, the Obama Ad-
ministration (and the Bush Administration before it) 
has pushed the importance of the TPP as balancing 
China, from both economic and security standpoints:
 
[T]he TPP means that America will write the rules 
of the road in the 21st century. When it comes to 
Asia, one of the world’s fastest-growing regions, the 
rulebook is up for grabs. And if we don’t pass this 
agreement —if America doesn’t write those rules—
then countries like China will. And that would only 
threaten American jobs and workers and undermine 
American leadership around the world.17
Trade negotiations have often reflected both se-
curity and economic interests. The GATT, in particu-
lar, had important security overtones given the Cold 
War context. The bilateral FTAs concluded by the 
Bush Administration in the 2000s were often created 
with a clear political and security intent.18
What differs in this case is that the growing do-
mestic opposition to trade liberalization has made 
selling the TPP very difficult, leading to reliance 
on oversold strategic claims about the US-China 
relationship and broader security concerns in the 
Pacific.19 In May 2015, a letter from seven former 
defense secretaries and ten top military leaders to the 
House noted: “China is already pursuing an alter-
native regional free trade initiative. TPP, combined 
with TTIP [the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership], would allow the United States and our 
closest allies to help shape the rules and standards for 
global trade.”20 In concluding, the letter argued:
The stakes are clear. There are tremendous strate-
gic benefits to TPP and TTIP, and there would be 
harmful strategic consequences if we fail to secure 
these agreements. In both Asia-Pacific and the 
Atlantic, our allies and partners would question our 
commitments, doubt our resolve, and inevitably 
look to other partners. America’s prestige, influence, 
and leadership are on the line.
Current Secretary of Defense Ashton has also 
emphasized this strategic theme. As he put it:
[Y]ou may not expect to hear this from a Secretary 
of Defense, but in terms of our rebalance in the 
broadest sense, passing TPP is as important to me 
as another aircraft carrier.21
‘When it comes to 
Asia, one of the 
world’s fastest-
growing regions, 
the rulebook is 
up for grabs’
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What has been the Chinese reaction to these 
claims, both economic and security, about balanc-
ing against China? Although Chinese academics and 
commentators have claimed that the United States 
is pushing the TPP to contain China,22 Chinese of-
ficials have been more measured in their response. 
For example, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang 
made a statement telling nations “not to politicize 
trade and economic issues”23 and President Xi Jinping 
at the November 2015 APEC meeting argued that 
its members should “make free trade arrangements 
open and inclusive to the extent possible with a view 
to enhancing economic openness in our region and 
upholding the multilateral trading regime.”24
Yet with the US election season underway and 
with Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and the 
leading Republican contenders already opposing the 
TPP, passage is not likely to be easy. The temptation 
to frame the TPP in economic and strategic balance 
of power terms in an effort to pass it may thus divert 
attention from the specifics of the agreement.
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
The mega-trade agreement abbreviated as RCEP 
consists of 16 countries known as ASEAN+6. This 
grouping brings together the 10 member states of 
ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Ma-
laysia, Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand, and Vietnam), and six major re-
gional economic partners (Australia, China, India, 
Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). These six 
countries have already signed FTAs with ASEAN as 
a group. ASEAN, initially founded in 1967 as a re-
gional security forum during the Cold War, gradu-
ally expanded its mission to include the promotion 
of region-wide trade liberalization. The ASEAN+3 
grouping was created in 1996, with China, Japan, 
and South Korea. Australia, India, and New Zea-
land’s later participation eventually transformed 
this grouping into ASEAN+6.
Japan first proposed a free trade area covering 
ASEAN+6 countries. With the TPP underway, Chi-
na, which initially was strongly pressing for an ASE-
AN+3 grouping, agreed to the ASEAN+6 approach. 
Moreover, ASEAN countries not involved with TPP 
negotiations were also keen to make progress in trade 
liberalization, including Indonesia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines, three of the four most populous 
members of ASEAN.25 
The creation of RCEP was formalized in Novem-
ber 2012. In May 2013, officials established work-
ing groups on the three issues they hoped to address: 
trade in goods, trade in services, and cross-border in-
vestment. In contrast to the TPP, which aims to be-
come the “gold standard” for international trade and 
tolerates few carved-out exceptions for individual 
countries, RCEP is considerably more accommodat-
ing and focuses on traditional trade policies, rather 
than the comprehensive set of domestic policies and 
regulations being discussed in the TPP. Currently, 
negotiations are ongoing and 11 rounds have been 
completed. Although participants have set the end of 
2016 as the target, this deadline seems overly ambi-
tious given the relative lack of progress.
RCEP will create the largest free trade area in the 
world. While it will account for about 30 percent of 
global GDP, less than the TPP, it will have a combined 
population of over three billion people.26 Studies 
conducted on the potential impact of RCEP on US 
businesses have led some researchers to argue that the 
effect on US exports will be limited, as US exports to 
RCEP countries rarely compete with products from 
other RCEP countries. Examples of these US products 
include aircraft, medical devices, and pharmaceutical 
products. Nevertheless, while RCEP might not be di-
rectly detrimental to US businesses, it is clear that the 
treaty will enhance China’s regional economic power 
by allowing it to greatly expand its trade influence. 
FTAAP, TPP, and RCEP:  
Fitting the Institutional Pieces Together?
With the United States and China continuing to 
push forward rival mega-FTAs, China announced 
an interest in rekindling the FTAAP in November 
2014. At the 2014 APEC summit in Beijing, Chi-
nese President Xi Jinping announced several projects 
that aim to enhance trade and cooperation within 
the Asia Pacific region, including the FTAAP. China’s 
‘… in terms of our 
rebalance in the 
broadest sense, 
passing TPP is as  
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The incompatibility 
of the TPP and 
RCEP, given their 
sharply differing 
goals, is likely to 
prevent a happy 
reconciliation
proposal to revive the FTAAP, although surprising in 
view of its lukewarm reception when the topic was 
first broached a decade ago, was subsequently en-
dorsed by APEC leaders, including President Obama. 
The president also argued that the United States does 
not intend to use the TPP as a tool of containment 
against China, but that the treaty, along with RCEP, 
will form a foundation for a region-wide deal like 
FTAAP.27 Analysts expect that the FTAAP will like-
ly contain higher standards than RCEP, but will 
probably not match the TPP’s “gold standard,” as 
China and other Asian countries do not seem ready 
to accept the TPP’s wide-ranging stipulations.28
Can TPP, RCEP, and FTAAP fit together from 
an institutional architecture standpoint? Conceptu-
ally, to avoid conflict among overlapping institutions, 
three alternatives are possible: hierarchically ordered 
nested accords, horizontal division of labor, or simply 
institutions with independent mandates.29 An example 
of nesting is the relationship of the WTO to regional 
FTAs (with the latter recognized under Article 24). 
Horizontal division of labor can be seen in the original 
relationship between the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, with the former focusing 
on short-term balance of payment lending and the lat-
ter on longer-term projects.
Suggestions that RCEP could provide a stepping-
stone to the broader and more liberal TPP for some 
members, with both under the FTAAP umbrella, are 
dubious as the precedent for such an approach is not 
promising.30 In 1994, the EU and EFTA created the 
European Economic Area (EEA), an umbrella orga-
nization for the EU and EFTA, allowing eastern Eu-
ropean countries to join EFTA as a stepping-stone 
to EU membership.31 Yet the EEA ultimately failed 
as prospective applicants pushed to join the EU di-
rectly. While the EEA, EFTA, and the EU continue 
to exist, the EU is clearly dominant, and the nesting 
idea has not worked well. In the case of the TPP and 
RCEP, while both transregional accords are likely to 
persist—since institutions rarely die—their incom-
patibility, given their sharply differing goals, is likely 
to prevent a happy reconciliation. 
Although both are trade agreements, the TPP and 
RCEP differ significantly. RCEP is likely to follow 
the Chinese approach of signing first and negotiating 
later. It is also much less focused on behind-the-border 
measures, which are the subject of the TPP. With most 
Asian countries pursuing active industrial policies, 
strongly binding rules that would constrain govern-
ment behavior seem unlikely. While China and other 
participants would clearly benefit from market open-
ing under RCEP, Chinese businesses worry that they 
will be negatively affected by the TPP because Chi-
nese exports to the United States, such as electronics 
and textiles, tend to be in the same sector as exports 
from TPP countries.32 The passing of a final version 
of the TPP has spurred RCEP negotiations. As far as 
the FTAAP is concerned, while the United States and 
China are now co-chairing a study on its benefits and 
prospects, at best this is a long-term goal.
Conclusion
With the rise of alternative trading arrangements, in-
cluding sectoral, regional, and bilateral accords, coun-
tries have created a complex and often unmanageable 
set of accords that may actually undermine rather 
than facilitate open trade. Each agreement has its 
own rules and procedures, and the various exceptions 
and restrictions often make it difficult for businesses 
to manage their global supply chains. While this is 
undoubtedly a problem for large firms, it is clearly a 
nightmare for smaller companies. In this context, the 
move to create so-called mega-FTAs such as the TPP 
and RCEP can be seen in a positive light. 
However, negotiation and, in the case of the 
TPP, ratification are by no means a foregone con-
clusion. The rise of anti-globalization sentiment in 
the United States has meant that the Obama Ad-
ministration (and the Bush Administration before 
it) has overemphasized the security benefits of these 
accords. Thus, the efforts to push the TPP through, 
and the likely efforts over the next year, will carry 
a strong tone of economic and security balancing 
against China. While China’s reaction has been rela-
tively restrained, these arguments often strain cre-
dulity and fail to emphasize the TPP’s own merits.
In this context, given the creation of potentially 
two rival mega-FTAs in the Asia Pacific region, the 
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RCEP led by China and the TPP led by the United 
States, reconciliation of the two accords is being dis-
cussed. This has led to a renewal of interest in the 
FTAAP, which might serve as an umbrella arrange-
ment under APEC’s auspices. Yet for the moment, 
the FTAAP seems a distant goal, and the logic of 
nesting quite disparate accords is not promising.
Still, if both mega-FTAs come into effect, they 
will influence the economic and political dynamics 
within the AsiaPacific region. Given that the Unit-
ed States is currently pursuing a TTIP with the EU, 
a third major mega-FTA in the global economy, 
competition over who will set the rules of trade for 
the twenty-first century will continue to accelerate.
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